understandably see some form of business advantage in providing financial concessions, whether illegal or just gray, for market concessions. There is reason to suspect that, before 1977, business bribery to obtain market access in other countries was a widespread if secret practice. Officially, such corruption was and is illegal in virtually all countries, but only the United States in 1977 and Sweden in 1978 adopted laws prohibiting business bribery abroad. The firms of these two countries were constrained in market access strategy, whereas the firms of all other countries were not similarly constrained. The situation has constituted a favorable policy environment for blocking constrained competitors'access. A transatlantic U.S.-European Union (EU) consensus on cooperation to suppress business bribery has recently developed that promises to change this public policy environment. The consensus must be transformed into enforcement machinery, and then enforcement must occur. The consensus reflects interactions among both states and firms.
The body of the article is organized into five sections. The first section explains the context for the case study. The second section examines the desirability of global and regional norms. The third section examines the difficulties affecting the establishment of such norms. The fourth and longest section is a case study of the developing U.S.-EU norm against business bribery of foreign public officials. The fifth and final section analyzes and explains the evolution of the anticorruption norm as a basis for discussing the implications for regional and global norm development in terms of both regime theory and ethical theory.
REGIONAL MARKET INTEGRATION AND GLOBAL NORMS FOR ENTERPRISE CONDUCT
Global economic integration is occurring through bilateral trade and investment linkages, and through formal regional arrangements such as the now 15-country EU and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which includes Canada, Mexico, and United States. 2 The EU is the most important and advanced instance of regional economic and institutional integration. It already resembles a federalist (or more accurately, a confederalist) state with an institutionally weak executive (the EU Commission), a country representative council of ministers (composition changing with agenda), a locally representative parliament (Inman & Rubinfeld, 1998) , and a court of justice. Some 48% of the Deloitte ("What Challenges," 1998) survey respondents believe that Western Europe will be politically unified by 2005, and 56% that unification will provide business opportunities for their U.S.-based firms.
The EU and NAFTA are moving toward some form of transatlantic free trade area (TAFTA). The EU foreign ministers voted in November 1995 to work toward a possible TAFTA with the United States. In December 1995, the U.S.-European Summit held in Spain announced a new transatlantic agenda (NTA) aimed at improving cooperation in 150 policy areas. The joint U.S.-EU action plan included support of the already functioning Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) (December 3, 1995) , a conference of U.S. and EU business leaders, and the creation of a new transatlantic marketplace.
3 The TABD's November 1998 Charlotte Statement of Conclusions (TABD, 1998) "stresses the urgent need for early ratification of the [1996] OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] Convention on Criminalizing Bribery of Foreign Officials," attention to inclusion of solicitation of bribes, widening of the scope of the definition of corruption from "obtaining/ retaining business" to other forms (e.g., bribery of political parties or candidates), elimination of tax deductibility of bribes, and obtaining of consistency of "obligations imposed by different international organizations" (p. 15). The joint U.S.-EU action plan (December 3, 1995) addressed illicit payments: "We will combat corruption and bribery by implementing the 1994 OECD Recommendation on Bribery in International Transactions." At the May 1998 United Kingdom (UK) meeting, the U.S.-European Summit established a Transatlantic Economic Partnership aimed at both multilateral action through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and bilateral action to reduce trade, investment, and other market barriers. 4 Whether TAFTA would lead to a broader OECD economic arrangement-adding the more geographically isolated Australia, Japan, and New Zealand to NAFTA, the EU, the European free trade area (EFTA), and a few other countries-is problematic, but it is not beyond the range of plausible speculation. Similarly, there is speculation that NAFTA could lead to a broader Western Hemisphere free trade area (WHFTA). This article will focus on the U.S.-European TAFTA process. Collaboration between the United States and the EU is the key driver in the development of a global anticorruption norm and regime.
Regional developments likely reinforce and retard the broader global trend toward market integration (Preston & Windsor, 1997, p. 87) . Reinforcement occurs through increased international economic activity and multilateral consultation; free trade areas enlarge market scale and tend to promote competition and efficiency. Retardation can occur through the increased risk of regional trade conflicts over interregional barriers and discriminatory practices (Buchanan, 1998; Greenberger, 1997) .
5 Kobrin (1995, p. 32) concluded that regionalization will not retard globalization over the long run, but that it will materially affect distribution of benefits and costs among participants, the competitiveness of individual economies, and national welfares. These firm and country effects have serious political and hence international diplomatic implications.
There are five predictable (and widely expected) consequences of regional economic and political integration: (a) increased market size and reduced resource-mobility barriers, leading to (b) greater competition and efficiency, and (c) organizational evolution toward larger and more global multinational enterprises (MNEs); (d) supranational institutional development; and (e) increased demands for subnational devolution. At the same time that typical MNE scale and scope are increasing, the nation state's role will come under stress from both supranational institutionalization and subnational devolution developments. Regional integration across national boundaries may tend to accelerate both universalization and particularization (or idiosyncratization) of values (see Trompenaars, 1994) . The emergence of larger and more global MNEs creates a greater need for supranational consensus on standards, but it may also result in a decreased concern with local stakeholder interests (see Windsor, 1992) . There could be a tendency by governments to respond to MNEs'increased disregard for local interests by developing policies intended to coerce stakeholder responsiveness, thereby creating even greater pressure for supranational consensus on standards. The EU labor and social policy processes are likely instances.
Successful regional and global market integration involves the acceptance by participating countries of community-wide norms and international policy regimes. The theoretically interesting aspect of the development of a broader anticorruption consensus concerns the causes and effects of the process by which countries of diverse cultures, interests, and 418 BUSINESS & SOCIETY / December 1999 values have apparently collaborated to develop, over time, a multilateral agreement on a regional anticorruption norm that the United States and EU must enforce globally. This agreement will become an international policy regime when it is nationally implemented, nationally enforced, and adhered to in practice worldwide by enterprises and officials. The United States and EU will act through OECD, WTO, and other international institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to effect this regime.
The processes by which community-wide norms and international policy regimes develop from a diversity of cultures, interests, and values are complex and little understood. The purpose of this article is to advance the understanding of norm and regime development through a case study of the U.S.-EU collaboration on international bribery suppression. At the present state of knowledge, the case study is not likely to meet the model rigor obtained by Eisenhardt (1989) . Many firms and countries are involved. The case study is largely narrative, and it must overcome the secrecy or confidentiality of action and the paucity and unreliability of hard data. Bribery of public and quasi-public officials is a secret act; therefore, empirical information is difficult to obtain. Few analytical tools have been developed. Although, historically, prohibition of domestic bribery of public officials has been virtually universal and is a common law offense in Anglo-American tradition (Raphael, 1996, p. 61) , there has been little formal sanction against the bribery of foreign officials.
6 Indeed, available evidence suggests that international business bribery has been a widespread practice. Although the United States adopted a criminal prohibition statute, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) (Greanias & Windsor, 1982) of 1977, for which U.S. legal precedents existed, only Sweden followed this example (in 1978) . In 1996, the Organization of American States (OAS), OECD, EU, and United Nations (UN) all adopted policy positions for the suppression of bribery. (OECD and OAS had adopted recommendations and a plan of action, respectively, in 1994.) These developments point to a moralization of market practices.
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This article uses a state-market-firm perspective (see Audretsch, 1989; Stopford & Strange, 1991; Strange, 1994) . The framework involves an analysis of the interacting roles of consumers, enterprises, and governments in shaping market processes and outcomes. The interaction process is more complex than government intervention in market demand-andsupply forces. Firms and public policies influence one another. In the area of the corruption of public and other officials, firms face competitive opportunities and disadvantages. Some firms (and, arguably, their home countries) gain, and others lose. The distribution of benefits and losses varies across industries and countries, possibly influencing the disposition of various firms and states toward anticorruption policy and its enforcement. Suppression of corruption redistributes benefits and losses. Principal attention will be paid to the incentives facing firms and governments. U.S.-EU cooperation to suppress business bribery of public and other officials-especially officials outside the transatlantic community in developing countries-involves both national and international levels of interaction. Both private and government action has been important.
REGIONALIZATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE DESIRABILITY OF GLOBAL NORMS
The development of international policy regimes is proceeding in conjunction with bilateral trade and investment linkages-occurring through increasingly larger MNEs, and with regional and global economic arrangements such as the EU, NAFTA, OECD, and WTO. It is nevertheless reasonable to consider whether global and, by extension, regional norms are desirable. In the case of corruption suppression, a regional OECD-representing as it does the combination of NAFTA, the EU, and the EFTA with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and a few other countries-consensus will have to be enforced as a global norm. Typically, scholars have observed that global business has become pervasive, and they follow this observation with an assertion that necessary and sufficient norms either exist or ought to exist and will come into existence more or less naturally. The assertion, however, should not stand without a defense.
There is a true global economy of money and information. There are regional economies in which goods circulate freely and in which impediments to the movement of services and of people are being cut back. . . . And then increasingly there are national and local realities, which are both economic, but above all political. (Drucker, 1999, p. 64) Regimes may be created and enforced by dominant powers rather than by mutual consent. Norms articulated by a dominant power are, in the first instance, simply that power's values or interests. Community-wide acceptance is a process of both persuasion (or coercion) by the dominant power (or powers) and some degree of willing commitment by other participants.
The typical argument is as follows. There are four broad developments in the evolving global economy: (a) the increase in volume and 420 BUSINESS & SOCIETY / December 1999 composition of international trade and investment, (b) the increase in and strengthening of regional economic arrangements, (c) the associated emergence of larger and more global firms (Porter, 1986) , and (d) the increase in and strengthening of various forms of international policy regimes other than regional economic arrangements.
In current U.S. dollars, over the years 1970 to 1994, world gross domestic product (GDP) increased approximately from $3 trillion to $25.7 trillion, world exports from $315 billion to $4.3 trillion, and foreign direct investment (FDI) from $13 billion to $222 billion (Preston & Windsor, 1997, p. 30) . World trade and investment patterns are dominated by the OECD countries, particularly the Group of Five (France, Germany, Japan, United States, UK). In 1993, 69% of world exports originated in OECD countries, together with 98.8% of foreign-owned capital stock (Preston & Windsor, 1997, p. 35) . The bulk of this trade and investment occurs within the OECD membership. Table 1 shows general trade and investment patterns, both within and between the four regions of the world. Europe is comprised of the 15-country EU and the EFTA, the latter now containing Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. The rest-of-world category includes the oil and gas reserves of the Middle East. Intra-European trade is by far the largest single component in the world trading system at double the volume of intra-Asia-Pacific trade. Including this intraregional volume, trade into and from Europe is substantially higher than total Asia-Pacific or Western Hemisphere trade. U.S.-EU trade was $298 billion in 1997. At the end of 1996, the EU had more than $370 billion in capital stock in the United States, and the latter had more than $348 billion in capital stock in the EU. Bilateral trade accounted for over 6 million jobs in both partners, and U.S. investment in the EU accounted for 1 in 12 U.S. manufacturing jobs (U.S. Department of State, 1998) . The Transatlantic Economic Partnership comprises of 600 million people and has a purchasing power of $8.5 trillion (TABD, 1998, p. 1) .
Using a broad definition, some 35,000 MNEs operate through 170,000 foreign subsidiaries. The largest 100 MNEs control an estimated 16% of world productive assets, and the largest 300 control an estimated 25% (Lash, 1996, p. 8) . More than 90% of the world's largest enterprises are located in OECD countries, according to 1995 data reported by Business Week ("Global 1000"), Forbes ("500 Largest Foreign Companies"), and Fortune ("Global 500") (as cited in Preston & Windsor, 1997, p. 52) . These entities are overwhelmingly based in the Group of Five, although Canada, Italy, Switzerland, and the Benelux and Scandinavian countries are also important.
There is not a good comparable count of the number and types of international policy regimes, formal and informal. The IMF reported in 1994 on 68 regional economic agreements of various kinds (Lawrence et al., 1996, p. 1) . The count had grown since the earlier report by Robson (1987 , 422 BUSINESS & SOCIETY / December 1999 pp. 8-10). There are regional arrangements all over the world, in Europe, North and South America, Asia, and Africa. Regional market integration can occur in various degrees, including loose economic association, free trade area, customs union, common market, full economic integration (including, for example, a monetary union), and full political integration (Preston & Windsor, 1997, p. 89) . The evolution of the EU is widely seen as a model for the strengthening of regional arrangements over time. 9 Initiated as a six-country free trade area (the European Economic Community) in 1957, the arrangement expanded in size and scope over three decades. The EU became a true common market only as of 1992. Fuller economic integration within a monetary union is underway now.
A regime involves predictable behavior defined by widespread actor expectations (Preston & Windsor, 1997, pp. 15-16 ; based on Krasner, 1983, p. 2) . Formal institutional arrangements-membership, rules, and procedures-may define a regime, as with the EU and WTO, but they are not strictly necessary. Regimes are functional relationships between and associated behaviors among possibly diverse actors and/or entities, and they can occur within and across nation states. They may develop voluntarily or from pressure or coercion by a dominant power or small set of powers. Regimes may aim at collaboration, harmonization, or integration. Although a regime does not need to develop around a norm, there can be normatively based regimes. "Markets are probably the social institution most dependent on normative underpinnings" (Kratochwil, 1989, p. 47) . A norm is a standard, model, or pattern typical of or binding for a specific group of people-including organizations and societies. Our concern is with moral norms-norms that may prohibit (i.e., forbid) or command (i.e., compel) behavior (see Nadelmann, 1990) . For the purposes of this article, three general types of not necessarily compatible global norms may be identified.
One type comprises minimal standards or norms for the human rights of individuals, regardless of nationality. Donaldson and Dunfee (1994) argue the case for a particular set of global or universal norms of this type (see Donaldson, 1989) . These human rights are presumably binding on all governments, enterprises, and individuals. Such norms are value oriented and may be necessary, if not sufficient, elements of any conception of constitutional democracy. There is reasonable evidence to suggest that democracy and market integration are closely associated, although it is not clear whether democracy is a necessary and sufficient condition for market integration or vice versa. Corruption of public officials and amoral conduct by businesses undermine the values underlying constitutional democracy.
A second type comprises necessary and sufficient standards for transnational market integration, whether regional or global in scope. Economic exchanges arguably cannot occur except under certain conditions, and the efficiency of exchange is arguably improved under other, desirable conditions. An instance of this would be reliable transnational contract enforcement. This line of argument considers the necessary and sufficient conditions for market integration (Bryant & Hodgkinson, 1989, p. 1; Panic, 1988, p. 283) . Global norms for market integration include fairness, defined here as a level playing field for all firms in all places, and efficiency, defined here as a single rule book everywhere.
A third type comprises of the consensual agreement on what are perceived to be desirable measures for transnational market integration. Such standards are not strictly necessary, but they presumably improve collaboration and harmonization efforts, and are therefore matters of judgment or expediency on which interest and value perspectives can readily deviate. For example, such agreements are most likely to involve matters of environmental protection or labor practices. The typical arguments for an anticorruption norm fall into the second type described above, but there are clearly elements of desirability from the U.S. perspective. Desirability partly drives U.S. leadership on this matter, and it may partly explain the EU's assent to U.S. proposals.
DIFFICULTY OF ESTABLISHING REGIONAL AND GLOBAL NORMS AND REGIMES
Despite research into cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Gray, 1991) and international regimes (Haggard & Simmons, 1987; Krasner, 1983) , relatively little is known about how cooperative behavior and norm consensus develop and interact. There may be obvious advantages in mutual economic gain such that a pure trial-and-error approach can drift in a socially desirable direction. However, as Husted (1994b) points out, economic logic may be attenuated by values and social networks. Global norms and regimes are unlikely to arise and flourish more or less automatically. Diversity-of cultures, interests, values-alone is a substantial barrier to normalization and regime development. There is an important role for regime development leadership, whether exercised through dominance or moral authority. The two elements may be, and likely are, mixed together.
Under these conditions, regional market arrangements may give rise to global norms and regimes more rapidly and effectively than 424 BUSINESS & SOCIETY / December 1999 comprehensive global efforts. One reason is the nature of club goods, which have lower transaction costs and greater scope for leadership by one country (such as the United States) or a small number of countries (such as the Group of Five). Regional bodies-the OAS, OECD, and EU-are now acting more rapidly (at least as to enactment) than the UN on foreign corrupt practices. (In December 1996, the UN issued the Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions.) This circumstance suggests that regional dominance and moral authority, as well as the barriers due to transaction costs in large and diverse associations may serve as important factors in the pace of global norm and regime development. Velasquez (1992) argues that certain kinds of global norms may constitute international public goods as defined by Kindleberger (1986) . A public good is one that, due to technical characteristics, will not be supplied by the market economy because although demand exists, it will not be revealed by rational consumers when the output is priced. (One may similarly define a merit good as one supplied suboptimally by the market economy, in someone's opinion. A country such as the United States may then act unilaterally to supply such a merit good, as in the case of the FCPA.) The technical characteristics of public goods involve the simultaneously joint or collective consumption (as in the enjoyment of a corruption-free global economy) and inability to prevent free riding by nonpayers (as in the shirking of suppression and enforcement expenses by certain countries). The marginal cost and price of such a good are zero, although the marginal benefit of consumption and the average cost of production are positive. Either government must compel payment, or a more motivated actor (e.g., a dominant power such as the United States) must handle the provision of such a commodity through direct subsidy or loss of economic opportunity.
That a global norm is necessary, much less desirable, for interaction does not mean that it will simply appear automatically, much less without cost. Velasquez (1992) concludes that an international enforcement agency is a necessary condition for the provision of international public goods. Neither a world government nor any substitute enforcement agency exists. Regional consensus-within the EU, OAS, OECD, or NAFTA-may serve as a substitute. Such regional arrangements operate through a consensual club process, as will the Transatlantic Economic Partnership. The diversity within regional clubs is typically less than that within truly global organizations. A club good is one supplied by a voluntary association or alliance of actors. Given the small number of participants, voluntary clubs can negotiate common standards and costsharing arrangements. Transaction costs will rise with the number of participants. Lawrence et al. (1996) anticipate the development of a "world of clubs," combining international integration and national sovereignty. The United States has functioned as both a dominant power (it is important to the EU) and a moral leader on the issue of foreign corrupt practices. One can argue that a bribe-free marketplace is a club good or a merit good (some people and countries want more of the good, whereas others either do not care or want less of the good) rather than a true public good. There is no enforcement agency other than good-faith compliance by member countries through implementation and enforcement, and the threat of titfor-tat retaliation by the United States in particular. The role of the United States is critical in the regional and global acceptance of an anticorruption norm and regime.
The effort of having a multilateral regulation of MNEs antedates the 1974 Watergate scandal. In 1972, Chile protested to the UN General Assembly concerning the political activities of the U.S.-based International Telephone & Telegraph (ITT), a protest that resulted in United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Resolution 1721. The incident led to a 1974 UN effort to develop the global Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, which exists in draft form, but it has not to date been adopted formally by the UN, partly because of the United States's opposition to some of its principles and elements. 10 The UN has also developed initiatives dealing with accounting practices, consumer protection, restrictive business practices, and international sale of goods (see Preston & Windsor, 1997, pp. 73-81) . These initiatives are recommendatory and hence require good-faith implementation by national governments and good-faith compliance by enterprises.
In broad-brush terms, the UN and regional initiatives attempt to combine several different principles and considerations. Among these principles and considerations are free and competitive markets and resource flows, transparency of enterprise activities and public policies, national sovereignty (preserved in the EU as the subsidiarity principle of leaving policy at the lowest level possible) relative to MNEs, and protection of particular stakeholder interests (consumers, employees, and stockholders) against management misconduct. A corruption-free global economy is one of the principles modeled on the FCPA that is encoded in the UN effort.
A CASE OF A DEVELOPING REGIONAL AND GLOBAL NORM AGAINST BRIBERY
Corruption is defined as any misuse of public or quasi-public office or any other position of trust (Banfield, 1975; Bardhan, 1997; Goudie & Stasavage, 1997; Nas et al., 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) . The 1977 FCPA covered quasi-official (e.g., political party) and government officials, corporate agents, and middlemen. (Language concerning agents was softened in the 1988 amendments.) There is a gray area covering both greasing or tipping (the FCPA exempted facilitating payments), and direct or indirect corporate concessions made for public interest rather than private gain. An absolutist position on corruption regards gray as black. A relativist position is much looser in defining true corruption. Developing countries are apt to take the relativist viewpoint, particularly when the compensation of lower officials and concessions for the public interest (even if skimmed by officials) are involved. The TABD wants a broad definition of corruption, as explained earlier. Corrupt practices include both bribery (i.e., unsolicited offers) and extortion (i.e., unsolicited demands). At least two actors must be involved in a corrupt transaction (whether bribery or extortion): the intended receiver (public or other official or trustee) and the intended payer (in international business, a representative of an enterprise that is privately or state owned). Corrupt practices are thought by many to be part and parcel of international business. Businesspersons from the OECD member countries assert that it is impossible to do business in certain parts of the world without paying bribes. Indeed, it is apparent that official corruption is tolerated in some countries more than in others. Although many in business attribute differing levels of corruption to variances in culture or values, implying that some cultures are corrupt and/or that actors have different values, there may be some pragmatic (i.e., economic or political) reasons for local tolerance of corruption.
It is possible to construct a case in favor of corruption or, at least, a case in favor of a particularistic rather than universalistic treatment of the matter. Pastin (1986) explains that, "in fact, bribes may promote our individual or collective best interests" (p. 472). For example, in cases where several companies may be competing for a single government permit to operate, corruption becomes an auction mechanism whereby the most efficient firm will be able to pay the highest bribe to obtain the permit (Leff, 1979) . If so, the government awards the permit using arguably a rational rather than an ad hoc criterion. The criterion used is a proxy for Windsor, Getz / INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY 427 efficiency: the lowest cost firm wins due to its ability to pay the highest bribe.
11 Furthermore, the business that results from the bribe may stimulate the economic development process (Nye, 1979) . The negative economic impacts of official corruption, increased costs and prices, inferior commodities, and reduced government revenues may be, or at least appear to be, "absent or minimal" (Pastin, 1986, p. 471) .
There are important distributive aspects to the argument, considered by the size of the country or level of economic development, that can imply particularistic attention, at least from the perspective of the payer's or receiver's home country. First, it can be argued that, in terms of the interest of smaller countries in maintaining domestic employment, bribery to obtain foreign business opportunities is an economically sensible policy ("Competitive Bidding," 1996) . Such a defense may be weak (or weaker) for the Group of Five or Seven (adding Canada and Italy). The EU and OECD contain countries of quite different sizes and levels of economic (and even political) development. (NAFTA involves a similar set of differences.) Smaller EU or other OECD countries may be both more dependent on foreign trade and less economically diversified. These variations cause difficulties in the development of region-wide norms and regimes. Second, corruption may be an unavoidable correlate of the level of economic development and/or national culture (Banfield, 1958; Husted, 1994a; Scott, 1972) . Donaldson (1989) observes that ethically acceptable practices by businesses may appropriately vary with the level of development. Hence, a prohibition of bribery within and among OECD countries might not necessarily extend to their dealings with developing countries. These cases amount to a realistic or pragmatic approach to defining and implementing national interest in international relations (Morgenthau, 1950) . The OECD club countries will necessarily need to persuade or impose on the other countries involved in economic relationships with them to enforce a global anticorruption norm and regime.
Despite these possible defenses of bribery and corruption, the consensus of opinion now appears to weigh heavily on several grounds (economic, diplomatic, moral, and political) against anything less than a universal principle of bribe-free markets and governments. This consensus favors the view that bribery threatens international trade and business development ("Bribery Threatens Trade," 1996). Although cited above on the level of development, Donaldson (1989, p. 147) explicitly states that bribery is always morally wrong. As OAS Secretary General Cèsar Gaviria recently said, "corruption deprives all of us: our governments of their legitimate functions; our citizens of their resources and rights; and the international commerce of its balance and transparency" ("OECD Convention Signed," 1999, p. 4).
The account of the evolution of a global norm against bribery is handled as follows. The first subsection provides a description of norms around the world, revealed in the years following the 1974 Watergate investigation. The second subsection examines the apparent change in norms occurring within the EU and OECD during the period from 1996 to 1998. The third subsection discusses the practical outcomes of this change process in terms of implementation and enforcement.
Description of Regional Anticorruption Norms
Corruption suppression is not a value on which the members of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership automatically agree. On the contrary, there has been a substantial variation in perceived corruption among those countries (see Table 2 ). Still, strong mores against the domestic bribery of public officials by individuals or organizations are virtually universal. This long-established global norm makes any form of bribery or related corruption of or illegitimate influence on public officials morally and socially suspect. Folkways, both the perceived legitimacy of mores and the actual practices, vary much more substantially, even within the United States by state and industry. By contrast, mores and folkways concerning the bribery of foreign public officials vary even more widely around the globe and within member countries of both the EU and NAFTA. Historically, no formal norms have been codified in most countries.
The statutory situation has been different in the United States. Before 1977, a number of narrowly defined statutory antecedents to the FCPA in fact already existed, due in substantial measure to the global nature of American foreign policy interests and activities in the Cold War era. The essence of the securities and exchange acts, to which the FCPA was an amendment, is the public disclosure of pertinent information and the prohibition of insider trading on asymmetric information. Financial reports are intended to give a reasonable picture of the true economic situation of an accounting entity. Secret expenditures and hidden reserves (as once practiced by certain German companies, for example) distort that picture.
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In at least some European countries and in Japan, quite a different ethos prevailed (see Table 2 ). Some 14 European nations permitted, either explicitly or tacitly, the deduction of foreign bribes against corporate taxes ("Bribery Threatens Trade," 1996; Cooper, 1996; "OECD Asks Repeal," 1996) . That this picture is not universal is suggested by the Swedish action Windsor, Getz / INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY 429 to prohibit foreign bribery in 1978. To date, no other country has adopted such legislation.
Bribes are expected by certain government officials and middlemen (agents) in many developing countries, and domestic corruption is widely practiced ("Cleaning Up," 1996; Husted, 1994a; "Is Corruption," 1996) . As reflected in Table 2 , Israel and Singapore provide examples that show that, at least in emerging countries, corruption need not prevail.
One consequence of these different norms has been having different levels of corrupt activities across countries. Although it is, of course, not possible to know the true extent of corrupt transactions in international business, efforts have been made to assess the likely extent of corruption. The most credible of such assessment is the aggregation of surveys published annually by the nongovernmental organization, Transparency International (TI), which shows considerable variation in perceived corruption throughout the world (see Table 2 ).
13 Table 2 classifies TI's 1996 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) data by the type of economy, whether it is advanced, emerging, or developing.
14 TI does not report a CPI for every country. Although many EU countries have relatively clean perceptions, Italy, Turkey (an associate EU member), Spain, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, and France (proceeding from more to less perceived corruption) have relatively dirtier perceptions. Even within the cleaner members of the OECD, there is a significant spread between the United States at 7.66 and New Zealand at 9.43 CPI. The poorest scores are found in emerging and developing countries. There is substantial perceived corruption in Latin American countries subscribing to the OAS accord ("Cleaning Up," 1996). There is evidence of corruption in Eastern Europe (e.g., Russia, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic), where the EU is establishing stronger economic linkages.
Evidence of Change in Regional Anticorruption Norms
The 1977 FCPA imposed civil and criminal penalties on the bribery of foreign governmental and political officials by U.S. enterprises, while exempting facilitating payments (or greasing for speediness of clerical actions) from the definition of bribery. 15 The FCPA also imposed stringent reporting and internal accounting control requirements on all U.S. enterprises (even if purely domestic in business). After Swedish action in 1978, anticorruption efforts proceeded slowly in the UN, within the Code of Conduct development process, and in private and quasi-governmental channels through the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Competitiveness Act, which (a) softened the FCPA reason-to-know standard in favor of liability only for specific authorization so that responsibility for agents or middlemen was lessened, and (b) excluded facilitating payments, payments or gifts that are lawful in the country of operation, courtesy payments or gifts, selling or purchasing expenditures, and ordinary expenditures of contract performance (see appendix).
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In December 1994 at the Summit of the Americas, the OAS adopted a plan of action aimed at strengthening democracy and combating corruption (OAS Homepage, 1997). In 1995, spurred on by Venezuela, the Working Group on Honesty and Public Ethics drafted the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, which was signed in March 1996 by 21 of 34 members (Babbitt, 1996) . Other members, including Canada and the United States, had to undertake domestic approval first. The OAS convention makes recommendations for policies and practices that ultimately would make bribery or corruption more transparent and less appealing. Specifically, it calls for raising public awareness of the effects of corruption. It also calls for measures to bring recipients of bribes to justice, suggesting ways in which offenders might be detected, and including extradition and confiscation, on both national and international levels, of money or property gained through corrupt practices. The convention calls on the OAS General Assembly to devise a strategy for implementing preventive measures (OAS Homepage, 1997) . The intention clearly is to outlaw bribery at some point. The convention entered into force in March 1997, even though not all OAS members have yet ratified it ("OECD Convention Signed," 1999).
The significance of OAS action is twofold. First, it has come in the form of a binding treaty rather than a set of nonbinding recommendations. Although it does not ban bribery, it does require that members cooperate on developing antibribery practices. Second, there is a widespread perception (see Table 2 ) that many OAS member countries condone bribery and corruption, at least by custom (McGugan, 1995) . Active participation in OAS anticorruption efforts may help to dispel this perception, especially because the convention gives explicit attention to the recipients of bribes.
In May 1994, after 4 years of preparatory work, the OECD issued the nonbinding Recommendations on Bribery in International Business Transactions (TI, 1996) endorsed by the 1998 U.S.-European Summit. The OECD called on member countries to take steps nationally and internationally to deter, prevent, and combat the bribery of public officials in foreign countries. This call included reviewing criminal, civil, administrative, tax, business accounting, and banking laws for provisions that directly or indirectly favor bribery. The OECD recommendations also called for strengthening international cooperation in identifying and combating bribery. In May 1996, OECD members agreed to criminalize the bribery of foreign officials ("Organization for Economic Cooperation," 1996) and recommended that governments act to introduce anticorruption provisions into contracts funded by their aid budgets. In December 1997, OECD ministers signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which has been ratified by Canada, Germany, Japan, Korea, UK, United States, and six nonmember countries (Croatia, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, and Venezuela) ("OECD Anti-Bribery Convention," 1999; "OECD Convention Signed," 1999). The treaty entered into force on February 15, 1999. Elements of OECD anticorruption policy include (a) criminalizing the bribery of foreign public officials; (b) implementing civil, commercial, and administrative laws and regulations to make bribery illegal; (c) changing tax laws so that they do not favor bribery (e.g., ending tax deductibility of bribes); (d) changing business accounting to require recording of relevant payments; (e) creating banking, financial, and other record-keeping requirements for relevant payments; and (f) implementing laws and regulations related to public subsidies so that they could be denied if bribery occurred. The OECD also recommends international cooperation in investigations and legal proceedings, including extradition (OECD, 1997).
The significance of OECD action is twofold. First, because OECD members are home to most of the world's MNEs, most MNEs will be subject to treaty and national laws once they come into effect. Second, the agreement of certain OECD members, notably France, Germany, and Japan, to participate in these anticorruption efforts is remarkable, as these countries (and others as well) have been reluctant to take any actions that might reduce the success of their corporations' overseas activities (Blustein, 1997; Noonan, 1984; Sanger, 1997) .
In December 1995, the European Parliament adopted a report on combating corruption in Europe. In September 1996, the European Council adopted a protocol making it a crime in each member state to bribe an official of the EU or any EU-member state if the financial interests of the EU are damaged by the bribery. In May 1997, the EU Commission adopted a program for action. Points include the criminalization of the bribery of officials of the EU and member states, and cooperation with the OECD in criminalizing bribery outside the EU. The report criticized the tax deductibility of bribes and urged the EU to develop a program to abolish it (Heimann & Boswell, 1997) . Whereas historically, the EU has cast a blind eye toward bribery and corruption, it has now acknowledged the need to discourage such behavior in business.
The interest of the WTO in anticorruption efforts is clearly subordinate to its other activities. However, modest anticorruption action has been taken. In December 1996, the WTO ministerial created a procurement working group that is currently assessing the procurement practices of the World Bank, the UN, and other international organizations with the idea of discovering and adopting the best practices (e.g., those least likely to create opportunities for corruption). Negotiations on a WTO transparency agreement were conducted throughout 1998 and continue in 1999 (www.wto.org).
The World Bank's role in the anticorruption regime is different from those of other international organizations because it is not a policymaking body per se. However, it does dispense advice regarding fiscal, monetary, and economic policies, along with its loans. The World Bank has come to recognize that, by failing to take explicit measures to eliminate corruption, it in effect has contributed to corruption. Beginning in 1996, the World Bank issued new guidelines that are intended to eliminate opportunities for corruption by replacing administrative mechanisms with market mechanisms, simplifying tax systems, reforming regulations to enhance transparency, and strengthening institutions, both in government and in civil society. New procurement guidelines called for the World Bank to cancel a loan if key actors were to engage in corrupt or fraudulent practices to secure the loan. There are also procedures for black-listing offending corporations, procedures for investigating allegations of corruption, and a new requirement for the disclosure of commissions paid to agents (Heimann & Boswell, 1996; World Bank Homepage, 1997) .
A number of other international organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, have offered anticorruption resolutions or agreements. Although these efforts are less dramatic than those mentioned above, they deserve mention. There have been specific anticorruption statements from the UN, the Council of Europe, the ICC, and the Organization for African Unity (OAU). In 1994, the Council of Europe established the Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption and instructed it to draft a program of action against international corruption. The ICC appointed an anticorruption (Shawcross) commission in 1975. In 1995, the ICC substantially revised the Rules of Conduct on Extortion and Bribery, which are intended as a method of self-regulation, although the ICC also asserts that they should be supported by governments. In 1994, the OAU called on its member countries to adopt measures against bribery and to work closely with the OECD.
Practical Outcomes
In the case of regional accords within the OAS, OECD, and EU, formal consensus must be followed by two steps: (a) national ratification (i.e., implementation) and (b) national enforcement. Neither the OAS nor the OECD has an institutional structure for enforcement; there are implementation and enforcement difficulties related to the variance in tolerance for corruption and to the priority that may or may not be accorded to anticorruption efforts. In principle, the EU could undertake collective enforcement, but the matter has been left to its member countries. The EU contains member countries that are both at a lower level of economic development and perceived as having a higher cultural tolerance, or at least reputation, for corruption. The EU is grappling with the issue of the degree of economic integration that will occur with the formerly communist and developing economies of Eastern Europe (including states formerly constituting the Soviet Union). Mexico bears a similar relationship in NAFTA to Canada and United States, and many of the Western Hemisphere states that are developing are perceived as corrupt. Drug trafficking into the United States and the associated money laundering is a major industry in the hemisphere (see Tedford, 1999) .
The EU is in a process of supranational political and legal institutionalization leading to a possible federal constitution and truly federal institutions. However, integration can occur along a continuum, from a loose economic association (which, historically, the EU has been) through a political confederation (e.g., Switzerland) to a federal union (e.g., Australia, Canada, Germany, United States). The EU members have agreed to a principle of subsidiarity, which is defined as delegating policy making to the lowest possible level. Such a principle is weakest in a unitary state (such as France or the UK) and strongest in a set of fully independent states. Unity and autonomy form the extreme anchor points of the continuum defined above. Regional markets and supranational institutions should tend to promote the universalization of some values through perceived needs for integration and harmonization.
Paradoxically, supranational integration may tend to promote subnational disintegration to local interests and communities and the Windsor, Getz / INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY 435 idiosyncratization of values. There are significant tensions or frictions within the EU. Two key forces may be at work. First, supranational political institutions create new opportunities for community representation that are more difficult to obtain at the national level. Second, economic development may generate new opportunities for particularistic expression, or emphasize the differences between wealthier and poorer or less rapidly growing areas. There is talk, for example, in North Italy of severing ties with South Italy to avoid having to subsidize the poorer region. In some of the EU countries, there is a community-oriented process that emphasizes cultural and political independence in the form of demand for local autonomy. This political disintegration is rooted in the ethnic complexity of Europe. Some of the continent's ethnic minorities have been demanding greater autonomy. 16 The United States possesses the advantage of a single-language population in theory, but NAFTA creates greater requirements for economic integration with Mexico, which has not only a different culture and language but also a historical claim to the southwestern U.S. border region.
We offer seven testable propositions concerning the implementation and enforcement of the OAS, OECD, and EU accords. The propositions are stated in ceteris paribus form, holding other considerations constant. The propositions apply to all countries other than the United States. (Sweden is not necessarily excluded.) Essentially, the propositions argue that the more corrupt countries in the various regional arrangements will be slower at implementation and more lax at subsequent enforcement. Speed and laxness will be influenced by the degree of economic linkages to more corrupt developing and emerging countries outside the regional arrangements. (Hence, NAFTA and OAS face special difficulties.) These influences are, of course, moderated or otherwise affected by country-specific institutional factors (e.g., degree of governmental centralization, party system, stability of government, etc.), about which little specific information can be provided here. The distributive considerations noted earlier, together with country-specific institutional factors, presumably interact with the degree of corruption and of economic interaction with corrupt developing and emerging countries to affect the speed of implementation and laxness of subsequent enforcement. These logical propositions will become testable hypotheses as the implementation and enforcement processes unfold in time. Some of the propositions logically exclude the United States but not necessarily Sweden. bribery is that Stage 1 occurred rapidly in 1974 to 1977 in the United States (with Sweden following in 1978), whereas Stages 2 and 3 each lasted roughly a decade. Stage 5 is yet to occur. The seven propositions form an acid test for whether a functioning anticorruption regime can come into existence.
Stage 1. In the United States, the recognition of the problem of bribery in international business transactions developed only because of the Watergate scandal. Revelations of domestic campaign-financing corruption resulted in discoveries of overseas bribery by U.S. businesses. Outside the United States, the practice of international business bribery was not considered problematic until recently. The shift in European attitudes toward foreign bribery reflects a number of considerations. A French official stated, "we are faced with interdependence between the two objectives of economic progress and the further development of the democratic system" (Falletti, 1996, p. 84) . A report suggests that Germany has become concerned about the domestic corruption effects of foreign bribery ("Competitive Bidding," 1996) . Thus, the anticorruption accords reflect an interesting mix of economic, moral, and political motives.
Stage 2. There has been neither an immediate consensus nor a power dominance that would permit a direct movement to Stage 4. Instead, over a period of 20 years, the United States exerted a more or less constant moral leadership (viewed by many as pressure). That leadership has derived from a mix of moral considerations and economic and political concerns. As described above, the United States has paid a cost for its moral leadership. However, as Pastin (1986) argued, "the primary motivation . . . was ethical and political. . . . We oppose bribes because they violate our fundamental ethical principles" (pp. 470, 472) .
Stage 3. Negotiations are intended to establish a basis for cooperation. They may arise through a newly developing global norm or they may give rise to a new global norm (Getz, 1995a) . The fundamental, self-interested basis for voluntary collaboration is some perception of a win-win (i.e., positive-sum) relationship. Thus, negotiation regarding the suppression of corruption has revolved around means of building trust in potential enforcement activities (to minimize cheating and shirking), as well as around the specific provisions of an anticorruption accord. It was reported that at least some of the smaller countries in the EU regarded the change in tax treatment as unfair because nondeductibility would hinder them in 438 BUSINESS & SOCIETY / December 1999 international competition. Their view of a level playing field was quite different from that of the United States ("Competitive Bidding," 1996) . The key difficulty in the regional consensus is the uneven distribution of benefits and costs occurring in the shift from bribery to free competition.
Stage 4. The actual agreements were announced with great fanfare by the respective organizations. In fact, in most cases, there were joint announcements of the accords with the participation of member countries, nongovernmental organizations (especially TI), and private business organizations.
Stage 5. The EU, OAS, and OECD anticorruption accords specifically require national legislation and enforcement because there is no institutional structure for implementation. (The EU has institutional machinery, but the EU has left implementation and enforcement to its member countries.) As argued briefly above, it is likely that enforcement activities will vary across countries.
Regional developments appear likely to drive global norms and regimes in certain issue areas. A transatlantic (U.S.-EU) regional consensus for the suppression of international business bribery, and by extension other forms of corrupt practices, has a strong claim to amount to a formal global norm on the matter (see Frederick, 1991) . A key consideration is the interlinking roles of the United States in the OAS, OECD, NAFTA, and Transatlantic Economic Partnership arrangements. No doubt, some would argue that the EU, OAS, and OECD policies are merely rhetorical and do not in fact reflect a new global norm. However, multilateral consensus reflects an explicitization process, whereby explicit regulation creates a tendency for behavior to become legally oriented. Such explicitization justifies further formal regulation as organizations come to rely on legal mechanisms for behavioral guidance (Kling, 1988) . Multilateral agreements lead to legalistic responses on the part of MNEs (Getz, 1994) , thereby giving rise to a legal and behavioral norm (Getz, 1995b) . This norm is global because the prohibition and criminalization of foreign corrupt practices are necessarily extraterritorial because the incidents occur abroad. Effective prohibition must, of necessity, have global reach. The norm is a moral one on two counts. First, the consensus relies on principles of fairness and efficiency alleged to create greater global economic welfare. (The predicted effects might accrue from a mandatory disclosure without prohibition and criminalization.) 18 Second, the concept of the duty of public officials commands universal moral authority as a right of Windsor, Getz / INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY 439 citizens of all states, and it is already enshrined in the nearly universal prohibition of domestic corruption.
This article approaches the corporate social responsibility and performance implications of regional integration in the transatlantic community from the perspective of building theory through case studies. International business bribery is one instance of a broader class of corporate illegal activities. The American Criminal Law Review published each spring its annual White Collar Crime Project report (www.law.georgetown.edu/journals/aclr/index). Various regulatory statutes (e.g., antitrust, environmental, securities and exchange) define additional corporate or managerial illegal activities. Corrupt activities may simply be one instance of a much broader family of collaboration and harmonization issues as suggested by the 150-item U.S.-EU joint action plan mentioned at the beginning of the article. International accounting standards and tax codes are obvious examples of possible win-loss changes. There has been a suggestion that the FCPA is an appropriate model for international environmental regimes (Neff, 1990) .
For purposes of this article, there are two key debates and an additional relevant issue in ethical theorizing. One debate is between moral universalism and cultural relativism (Bowie, 1988) . The difficulty in this debate is determining which moral issues demand universal approaches and which permit cultural variation. Donaldson and Dunfee (1994) propose a minimum set of global human rights, leaving other matters to community formation and decision processes. Community formation is the process (ill defined in Donaldson and Dunfee) by which individuals, organizations, and countries decide on membership. In the present authors' view, the formation of an international community is reasonably synonymous with the normalization and regime development processes addressed in this article. To the extent that regional and local values do not violate any global or regional norms, respectively, variation is acceptable.
The morality of the marketplace may impose additional universal requirements (Freeman & Gilbert, 1988) . Such requirements are directly tied to the assumptions of neoclassical economics and the perceived benefits of capitalism such that, if the assumptions do not hold, the benefits may not be obtained. The consensus of opinion now is that corruption in business transactions is universally wrong. On this moral issue, cultural, societal, or regional variance is no longer acceptable because it is antithetical to widespread market capitalism. This consensus, with other considerations, has moved the OECD toward the suppression of bribery. Furthermore, the OECD's action is expected and intended to have global effects because of the global reach of OECD-based MNEs.
The other debate is between consequentialism (defined here as utilitarianism or group-majority welfare) and contractarianism (defined here as a combination of rights and duties). The difficulty in this debate is determining whether and when it is necessary to accept suboptimal group welfare to protect an individual's rights. In the corruption debate, the emphasis is on consequentialism rather than contractarianism because the economic, social, and political benefits of corruption suppression are stressed. However, even leaving aside the actual costs of corruption suppression and the national distribution of those costs, there are losers in the transition to a corruption-free global economy. Although all participants may gain in the long run (hypothetically), there is the practical problem of the transition from the present distribution of competitive gains and losses to both firms and countries. Economic welfare theory involves the possibility that harm may be imposed on a minority or majority of a group or community as long as there is a net gain to the group or community as a whole. If the winners gain more than the losers lose, then the winners could hypothetically compensate the losers (but, in reality, do not have to do so). As Mishan (1976, pp. 390-393) points out, this outcome can be viewed as morally suspect. Thus, the harms imposed by the transition to a corruption-free global economy, which might be perceived as a violation of (sovereign) rights, are considered acceptable-given the ultimate benefits that are expected.
A third issue in ethical theory relates to the cognitive reasoning that drives individual moral (or immoral) behavior. Most adults make ethical decisions based on the expectations of their social groups or the consequences for society at large rather than on simple self-interest (Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 1986) . This logic can be extended to the behavior of business organizations; there is more at play in business decisions than the economic logic of investments in transaction assets. Norms and social networks play an important role in business cooperation (Husted, 1994b) , and the social and normative context can modify economic activity in important ways (Granovetter, 1985) . Current efforts to suppress corruption exploit this understanding of how individuals and businesses make moral decisions. As argued above, the OECD and OAS have articulated a global norm against corruption that, by definition, creates behavioral expectations. Thus, the emerging anticorruption regime will induce MNEs to refrain from corrupt activities in conformance to the norms of the regime (Getz, in press) .
Regime theory concerns the definition, origin, functioning, and evolution of international policy regimes. The fundamental tenet of regime theory is that integrative international relations involve necessary and Windsor, Getz / INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY 441 sufficient actor expectations (possibly having a number of bases) that may be characterized as policy regimes. Participants may discover desirable expectations as well. The OECD value of corruption-free markets must become such an international policy norm. The main factors in the development of this regime, beyond transatlantic and OECD consensus under U.S. pressure, are the dominance and moral authority of U.S.-EU cooperation in the global economy. The key difficulty in the regional claim to a global norm is the extraterritorial application of their moral viewpoint, which may be interpreted as interference in a domestic policy matter.
There are salient lessons for regime theory in this still unfolding case study of value normalization leading to national implementation and enforcement. First, the case study reveals a conjunction of international and domestic considerations in key participants (the United States and Germany, in particular) to which, for a variety of motives, other participants are prepared to defer. Second, OECD and transatlantic consensus required a long period of development at some economic cost to the United States for being the first mover. Benefits likely accrued to EU countries and firms, and these benefits served as a barrier to transatlantic cooperation for the suppression of business bribery. Third, regional consensus and action may be easier to obtain than global consensus and action as suggested by the still unfinished UN effort at producing the Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, which incorporates anticorruption measures as one dimension. Fourth, focusing on a single issue may increase the tractability of the problem (Getz, 1995a) . Fifth, moral formulations may be easier to address because whatever other motives and interests may be at play, they are difficult to criticize except on purely pragmatic grounds.
The interesting aspect of the anticorruption accords is that they align regional and global interests with a particular value conception on an expectation of both economic and political gains. The value conception may or may not be valid in economic and political terms, but it is morally irresistible. In opposition, one can point only to the economic and political costs to oneself of suppressing corruption. If there are to be international regimes in opposition to other corporate illegal or irresponsible behaviors, they may well develop at the regional level around narrowly defined issues that can be described and explained using the languages of ethics and democracy.
16. The European nation-building process (occurring earliest in Spain, France, and England) encompassed the suppression, if not the attempted absorption, of minority populations who often possessed separate languages, including Cornwall, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales in the UK; Catalonia and the Basques in Spain; Bretons, Gascons, and Provençales in France. Switzerland is officially a multilingual state.
17. The immediate movement from Stage 1 to Stage 4 by widespread consensus is akin to Rousseau's notion of the general will of a community, based on the recognition of clear necessity as explicated in The Social Contract in 1762. The progress through Stages 3 and 4 is essentially his notion of private-interest factionalism.
18. Such an approach was proposed by the Ford administration in lieu of the adoption of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which was a congressional initiative.
